Perpetuity Statutes by Goddard, Edwin C.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1923 
Perpetuity Statutes 
Edwin C. Goddard 
University of Michigan Law School 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/804 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Property 
Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Goddard, Edwin C. "Perpetuity Statutes." Mich. L. Rev. 22 (1923): 95-106. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 




VOL. XXNI DECEMBER, 1923 No. 2
PERPETUITY STATUTES
som4t REVOIR3 STLATUhIES IN Mtl) Or~ RZ1ORMXATION'
By EnwIN C. GonDnzn*
T HE common law of perpetuities is one of the most interesting
examples of almost pure judicial legislation. De Donis, The
Statutes of Uses and of Wills, but gave wider scope to the develop-
ment by the courts of rules of law to thwart the attempt of the great
landowners to tie up their landed estates in their families in per-
petuity. One body of rules to this end limited restraints upon alien-
ation, another the creation of future interests vesting at too remote
a period. Restriction of restraints upon alienation, and the rule
against perpetuities, these two were developed for the same end,
have been often confused, but are separate and distinct remedies.
The rule against perpetuities seeks its end by forbidding the post-
ponement of the vesting of future interests beyond the period of a
life or lives in being and twenty-one years and nine or ten months.
The other rule forbids restraints upon the absolute power to convey
realty, and of the absolute ownership of personalty, beyond a like
period. Only in recent times have the two been clearly distinguished
by the courts.'
But if the distinction has been dearly recognized by some courts,
some American statutes have practically resolved the two into one
by their provisions as to restraints upon alienation.
The history of and reason for the development of this wholly
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1 London & S. W. R. Co. v. Gomm, 2o Ch. D. 562 (z88-).
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judge-made period of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years,
and nine or ten months, and a possible second nine or ten months,
has been set forth in many decisions, and very clearly and concisely
stated by Professor Gray in his classical "The Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," sec. 123 ff. It is interesting to notice that from Child and
Baylie's Case,2 1618, i623, in which Sergeant Davenport by his argur-
ment earned for himself the title "Father of Perpetuities," the Duke
of Norfolk's Case,3 168, in which perpetuities are first clearly per-
ceived and boldly admitted, to Cadell v. Palher,4 which added
twenty-one years, even as an absolute term, and ThellussonV . Wood-
ford,5 I8O5, which admitted a period of gestation at the beginning
and another at the end of any number of lives in being, provided
they were easily ascertainable, is precisely the period between the
settlement of the Colonies and the launching of the United States
as an independent nation with its own laws. This life or lives in
being and twenty-one years and nine or ten months was, therefore,
accepted in all the states as the period fxed by law within which a
future interest must vest, or beyond which the power of alienation
cannot be suspended.
Ready as the judges were to make this law, they have refused
absolutely to reform it, or even to narrow its application, in cases
in which they admitted the results were unfortunate and even deplor-
able.0 Legislation has had to step in where judges feared to tread.
To some of this legislation and its consequences attention is now
invited. In most states the common law period is the rule today;
in some it has been written into the statute law.5
Changes in the period have followed the New York statute of
183o. Two groups may be noted. I. Michigan,8 Wisconsin9 and
2 Cro. Jac. 459.
a3 Ch. Cas. i.
'x Clark & F. 372.
iI Ves. 112.
6 See, foi example, Thellusson's Case, .upra.
T See Ky. Stat. i909, § 236o. "The absolute power of alienation shall not
be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the estate,
and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter." For other statutes see 49
Am. St. Rep. ii8, note.
sMich., C. L. 19x5, §§ 11532, 11533.
OWisconsin Stat. 1898, §§ 2038, 2o39. (Wisconsin in 1887 added to tw,
lives "and twenty-one years.")
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Minnesota10 have practically copied the New York statute, providing
that "the absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended, by
any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than dur-
ing the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the crea-
tion of the estate." By another section "the power of alienation is
suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute
fee in possession can be conveyed." Future estates violating these
provisions are void in their creation. 2. California," followed by
North12 and South Dakota,13 Montana,14 Idaho,15 and some other
states, adopted the language of the New York statutes, but instead
of limitation to two lives their limitation is to the "lives of persons
in being at the creation of the condition or limitation."
It is important to notice that New York statutes contain a sim-
ilar provision against suspension of the absolute ownership of per-
sonal property beyond two lives in being. In general the California
group extends the same rule to chattels real as to realty,10 and so does
Minnesota,' 7 but no other state has adopted the New York statute
as to suspension of ownership of personal property. In cases involv-
* ing mixed realty and personalty New York cases have often been
misapplied because this difference was overlooked 8 This will pres-
ently appear.
As one may read in the elaborate opinions in Coster v. Loril-
lard,' and Hawley v. faimes2 the "three gentlemen, distinguished
for their legal learning, their ability and their industry," to whom
New York committed the revision of the common law in this field,
intended to "extricate this branch of the law from the perplexity
and obscurity in which it was involved; and render a system simple,
uniform and intelligible, which was various, complicated and
lo Minn., R. L. 1905, §§ 3203, 3204, 3212.
"'Kerr's C. C., §§ 715, 711.
22 N. D., R. C. i9o5, §§ 4744, 4745.
13 S. D., P. C. 1919, secs. 294, 295.
14 Mont., R. C. xi2mr §§ 6705, 67o6.
D Idaho, C. B. 1919, § 5335.
IG Kerr's C. C., § 770.
7 Minn., R. L. 1905, § 3212.
is Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 562, 569.
s 914 Wend. 265.
20 16 Wend. 6I.
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-abstruse." The language of the New York statutes was with slight
changes the language recommended by the revisers, and at first read-
ing it seems simple and intelligible enough. But if there was hope
that these simplifications would make certain what before required
expensive litigation to determine, it was ill founded. Instead, ques-
tions that before the statute would have been simple now required
elaborate, protracted and expensive attention. Coster v. Lorillard1
occupied 135 pages in Wendell. It was "fully argued before the
Vice-Chancellor, and again on appeal from his decree more elab-
orately before the Chancellor"; and in the court of errors "for ten
successive days by some of the most eminent counsel in this state,
with a talent, learning and ingenuity which have been rarely
equalled." The lawyers might be expected to disagree, but the
Chancellor did not agree with the Vice-Chancellor, and the court of
errors, by a nearly equally divided vote on some points, reversed the
Chancellor. Almost as much divergence of view appears in Hawley
v. James,'2 the next year, a case covering 225 pages in the report.
Restraints on alienation were often sought to be imposed by leaving
property to trustees, with directions to receive the rents and profits
and "pay them over" to the beneficiaries. Whether under the stat-
utes such a trust could be created divided the court equally in the
two cases just referred to, and it was not till Leggett V. Perkins,-3
decided in i849, that a "great question, which has been litigated
more than fifteen years, is at the last settled by a single vote, and
that vote governed by a supposed decision which I (justice Bronson)
verily believe was never made." That this uncertainty in the appli-
cation of these simple statutes did not disappear with the early cases
is seen in the very great number of cases still arising especially in
New York,2 - and the contrary decisions of different courts on the
same case as it goes to the court of last resort. See, for example,
Henderson v. HendersonP" (1889) decided forty years later, in
which the general term of the supreme court reversed a judgment
construing a will, and the court of appeals reversed the general term,
-114 Wend. 265-399 (1835).
22 J6 Wend. 61-285 (1836).
23 2 N. Y. 2497. t
24 See Gray, Rurz AGAINST PZRPZTUI xTS, § 75o, pointing out the danger
of radical legislation.
25 113 N. Y. I.
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and Matter of Sitsbya (1920) in which the court of appeals reversed
both the surrogates court and the appellate division of the supreme
court on the question whether a provision suspended the power of
alienation beyond two lives in being. Instances might be multiplied
ad itause tt.
It will be noticed that the statutes were directed at suspension of
power of alienation, not at postponement of vesting, except as that
affected power to alienate. It is not then really a provision as to
perpetuities under the so-called rule against perpetuities, though usu-
ally so spoken of.27 Mr. Gray28 has well pointed out the difficulties
and confusion arising therefrom. It was early settled that under
the statute any suspension of the power of alienation must be based
on lives, and not on any arbitrary term, however short.29 But
whether there was a suspension of the power, whether it was for
two lives, whether the rule was violated when the trustees were
directed to sell the property, or when they were empowered to sell it,
these and many other questions at once arose, causing a great increase
in litigation that has not yet after 90 years subsided.
The recent Michigan case of Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst,30
has furnished some surprises, and has caused a re-examination of
wills drawn for persons still living to see if they are within the rules
there laid down. The will attempted to dispose of an estate valued
at upwards of $2ooooo, consisting of personalty, and of realty
located in various states and in Canada. The chief point of attack
was a provision for three life payments of $75 per month each and
a direction that the remainder of the net income from testator's
estate be divided equally between his son (a minor), his brother and
two sisters until the son reached 25 years of age, when the son was
to have half the estate and the other half was to be charged as above.
There was a contingent remainder if the son died before reaching 25
leaving legal issue, but this was not important 'to the decision
20229 N. Y. 396.
2T Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412.
as Ruzr A;Azsr Pzap tRus, § 748.
20 Hawley v. James, r6 Wend. 6r; Rong v. Hailer, zog Minn. rpr; In re
Walkerly, ioS Cal. 627; Otis v. Amtz, i98 Mich. 196; State v. Holmes, 1i5
Mich. 456; Hagemeyer v. Saulpaugh, go N. Y. S. 8. In Wisconsin, statute
in 1887 had added "and twenty-one years thereafter." The effect is discussed
in In re Will of Kopmeier, 113 Wis. 233; Danforth v. Oshkosh, ig Wis. 26z.
$0220 Mich. 321 (Nov. i922).
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because the previous provisions were held to invalidate nearly the
whole will, at least so far as it affects property subject to the juris-
diction of the state. The court found that the various provisions of
the will created an express trust for the lives of seven persons, sus-
pending the power of alienation till the death of the last of the seven.
The beneficiaries by see. 11583, C. L. 1915, were forbidden to assign
or dispose of their interest. Nor could the trustees alienate so as to
satisfy the statute, unless thereby the estate was fully and inally
settled and the trust ended, and this notwithstanding the will clothed
the executors with "full power to sell, mortgage and convey any and
all of my estate and said trust estate."
On this last point it appears that the court failed to take account
of the difference between the Michigan and the New York statutes.
In New York it would indeed be in the face of the policy of the
law to allow the statute to be evaded by a permission, or a compul-
sory mandate, to the trustees to sell the real estate, if the proceeds
as personalty must be held subject to the purposes of the will or
deed for more than two lives in being.31 The New York statutes
apply alike to realty and to personalty. But in Michigan, contrary
to the dictum in the dissenting opinion of Champlin, J., in Palms v.
Palms,8 2 followed by the whole court in Niles v. Masolt,33 there is
no evidence in the statutes of any such policy of the law, except as
to realty. The New York statutes were adopted in i83o, they weie
copied as to realty, but not as to personalty, in Michigan in I848.34
The Michigan statute has stood without changing the common law
rule as to personalty for seventy years, showing that it is the Mich-
igan policy to cut down the common law period as to realty, but not
as to personalty. The court seems to admit that a compulsory man-
date to the executors to sell the realty would satisfy the statute, it
explicitly states that the Michigan statute applies to realty, as has
been held in many previous cases, and clearly indicates that if these
payments had been a charge upon personalty they would have been
good. What policy of the law is violated then in giving the execu-
tors full discretion in the management of the property? The statute,
as the courts have often held, does not require that there shall be
31 Brever v. Brewer, I Hun 147; Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y. 588.
32 68 Mich. 355.
33 126 Mich. 482.
4 Tom v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552; Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471.
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alienation, but only that the power of alienation shall not be sus-
pended beyond the period.3
In the days when Cooley, Campbell, Marston and Graves consti-
tuted the Michigan court it was said in Tlwtcher v. St. Andrew's
Church,86 "we think it is a self-evident proposition that the absolute
power of alienation is not suspended, where the instrument gives the
trustees power to dispose of the property at their option." The court
in the Herbst case thought the language was to be limited to cases
where alienation of the land ended the trust. And so it should be
in New York, but why in Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota,
where the legislatures have seen fit to omit the New York restric-
tions on suspension of the ownership of personalty? )In Wisconsin
it was frequently held that if the trustees have a power to sell the
realty, and it is fairly clear from the general scope and limit of the
will that it is necessary to do so to carry out the trust, the doctrine
of equitable conversion applies, and all will be treated as personalty
3 T
and in Becker v. Chester 8 the court considered the Michigan cases of
Pahns v. PaInts and Niles v. Mason,40 and rejected their reasoning
as based on the English common law and the New York statutes,
which treat suspension of alienation as one system applying to real
and personal property, whereas the Wisconsin and Michigan statutes
impose the restriction of the statute on real, but not on personal
property. The conclusion is reached that even though the power of
sale is not peremptory, and creates no conversion until it is actually
exercised, yet such power makes the lands alienable and the will
valid provided the converted fund by the terms of the will is to be
held for a -valid trust as personalty. This decision was approved in
Holmes v. Walter,4' and in Danforth v. Oshkosh, 2 in the broadest
3 Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 2.26, a leading New York case; Keyser v.
Mead, zo3 N. Y. S. rogi; Atwater v. Russell, 49 Minn. 2, 56; same pro-
visions in a deed, Atwater v. Russell, 49 Minn. 57, 77; Re Sacrison, 19 N. D.
i6o, :26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724, note; FitzGerald v. Big Rapids, 123 Mich. :81.
36 37 MicL .264.
3T Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. ig; Harrington
v. Pier, 1o5 Wis. 485; cf. Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471. See also Underwood
v. Curtis, 127 N. Y. 523.
38 115 'Vis. 90.
39 68 Mich. 355.
0 126 Mich. 482.
41118 Wis. 409.
12 119 Wis. 262.
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terms. "The absolute power of alienation of real estate is not sus-
pended, within the provision of the statute, when a trustee or other
donee of the legal title is given power and authority to sell and make
conveyance of complete title," and this regardless of whether the
power to sell was such as to work an equitable conversion. In Man-
gan o. Sl.ea,4 the Becker case was cited as authority, though in this
case the sale of the realty by the trustee was mandatory. In Minne-
sota no case exactly in point seems to have come to the supreme
court, but the language in Aizwdter v. Russell," quoted with approval
in Y. _1. C. A. v. Horn,45 puts no limitation on the doctrine "that
where trustees were given the power to sell lands, there was no
restriction upon alienation."
In Wisconsin, by a curious course of decisions, following dictum
in Dodge v. Williams,0 the astonishing conclusion has been reached
that the force of the statute is to abrogate the common law as to
restraints upon alienation not only of realty, but also as to person-
alty. "Expressio unius exclusio alterius." "In other words the
declaration is that in Wisconsin ownership of personalty may become
inalienable and tied up for all time."' 7 The absurdity of such a con-
clusion from the partial adoption by Wisconsin of the New York
statute is fully stated by Cassoday, C. J., in his dissenting opinion.45
In both Michigan and Minnesota it has been consistently held that
the failure to adopt the personal property provisions of the New
York statute leaves the common law period of life or lives iri being
and twenty-one years and nine or ten months in force as to restraints
as to alienation of ownership in personalty. 9 If there were in force
any such public pelicy as justice Champlin refers to in his dissenting
opinion in Palms v. Pans,5 which has been followed in the Jater
Michigan cases as a correct statement of the law, then surely we
should expect to find that public policy in the statutes in Michigan
43 r58 Wis. 619.
49 Minn. 22, 56.
-A 120 Minn. 404, 419. And see In re Tower's Estate, 49 Minn. 371, 378,
and In re Phelps' Estate, 182 Cal. 752.
4646 Wis. 70.
47 Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 9o.
48 Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 136.
49 Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355; In re Tower's Estate, 49 Minn. 371; In
re Trust under Will of Bell, 147 Minn. 62.
ro 68 Mich. 355, 386.
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as we do in New York. Justice Champlin himself in this opinion
points out that Michigan has not followed New York as to person-
alty, so that in Michigan a will of realty is good if it directs that
the real estate be converted into personalty. Why not equally if the
will permits that realty be turned into personalty? That would
carry out the testator's intent in the Herbst case, and there would be
no conflict with either statute or public policy. As has been shown,
it is of no importance whether there actually is alienation if only
there is someone who has the power to alienate. Would the court
hold that a third person to whom the trustees in reliance on the
power in the will in the Herbst case had sold the real estate would
not get good title? "The test of alienability of real or personal
property is that there are persons in being who can give a perfect
title."61
The question arises, does public policy forbid such provisions for
persons all in esse because there chance to be seven of them instead
of two? The fact that the statute has stood unchanged for almost a
century in New York, and for three-fourths of a century in Mich-
igan, is strong proof that public policy approves cutting down the
common law period, but Mr. Gray is justified in saying that the
limit of lives in being is a natural limit, but the limit of two lives is
arbitrary, cutting through the most ordinary provisions, and is an
invitation to litigation, as the event has proved.5 2 Why two rather
than one or three? As already noted, most of the states influenced
by the New York revisers have placed the limit at lives in being,
not at two lives, as in New York, and Michigan, Wisconsin and
Minnesota. Mr. Gray has pointed out 3 how unjustifiable upon prin-
ciple was theaddition of 21 years to cover a minority of a beneficiary,
and even more so to cover a term in gross. There seems to be no
better reason for limitations upon lives of those having no interest
in the will. A statute fixing the period of restriction or postpone-
nent at lives in being of persons beneficially interested would be
justifiable and understandable. But why should A be allowed to
give his wife a life estate and his only child a successive life estate,
tieing up his property for two lives in being, while B is not permitted
r2 Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N. Y. 519, quoted and approved in Becker
v. Chester, U15 Wis. 90.
52Rti AGAIxsT P a pmuiTres, § 749.
53 RuLe AGcANsT PPtrmTiss, §§ 186-188.
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after the life estate to the wife to make the same provision for life
for each of his two or more children? To take a case more like the
Herbst case, supra, why should A be allowed to limit two annuities
in the manner attempted in the Carman will in that case, while B
with seven living relatives for whom he attempts like provisions has
his will declared invalid, and all his intentions defeated? Public
policy surely does not approve when there happen to be only two
living persons to be provided for, but disapprove if there are three
or more.
That this is so is the more evident from the fact that the present
statute does not accomplish the object, if such be its intent. It is
merely a trap for the unwary, and it leads to endless litigation. If
only the testator be wary the law permits him to do just this thing,
and there has never been any statute to try to prevent it. It is all a
question of how the will is drafted. This is especially true in Mich-
igan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, where a direction in the will to con-
vert the realty into personalty permits the property to be tied up
not only for any number of lives in being, but also for twenty-one
years and nine or ten months, and this even when the executors are
given certain discretion as to the time within which to sell."
But even in New York there are still other ways of providing
for more than two. It is a mere question of using the right words
in the will. It has been held in a great number of cases that a life
estate to any number of persons in equal shares is but a limitation
for one life, each share being treated for this purpose as distinct,
and separately limited for a single life." The change of a few words
in the will in the Herbst case would have made all its provisions
valid, though the property were as effectually tied up as the actual
will contemplated.
5 See Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169.
5 See Lang v. RoPke, 5 Sandf. (N. Y. Supr.) 363, so treating parts of the
estate set aside for annuities; Roosevelt v. Porter, 73 N. Y. S. 8oo, and Smith v.
Havens Relief Fund Society, go N. Y. S. 168, affirmed in I9o N. Y. 557, are to
the same effect. But cf. Herzog v. Title Guarantee & T. Co., 177 N. Y. 86. And
see further Mason v. Mason's Exrs., 2 Sandf. Ch. 432; Buckley v. Depeyster,
:26 Wend. 2I; Wells v. Wells, 88 N. Y. 323; Robert v. Coming, 89 N. Y. 225,
a leading case; Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, iii N. Y. r78; Allen v. Allen, 149
N. Y. 280; Kalish v. Kalish, 166 N. Y. 368; Matter of Colegrove, 221 N. Y.
455 (part valid and part void); Hayden v. Sugden, 96 N. Y. S. 681. In re
Kohler's will, 183 N. Y. S. s55; In re McGeehan's Will, 193 N. Y. S. 856; In
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The New York revisers observed that "the interests of society
require that the power of the owner to fetter the alienation and sus-
pend the ownership of an estate by future limitations should be con-
fined within certain limits." Very true and well put. But can any
one offer a good reason to fix those limits at two lives rather than
at one or three or more? Michigan in more than 75 years has not
thought it necessary to confine the power even to lives in being as
to personalty. Why fix upon two lives as to realty? If restrictions
for lives are to be permitted at all, why not for the lives of all living
persons for whom the testator desires to provide? A limitation for
lives is but for a single life after all, that of the longest liver. If all
the candles are lighted at once they will all go out in the life of a
single candle" the one burning longest, and that might easily, though
not certainly, be one of the two permitted under the Michigan statute.
The statute permits any number of future interests provided they
all terminate within two lives.57 Why require the testator to specu-
late on which tvo lives will outlast the rest, and if his guess proves
to be wrong leave the remaining objects of his bounty unprovided
for after the death of the two ?5s The common law rule permitted
restrictions for 21 years and a period of gestation beyond any lives
in being, so that the owner might tie up his estates so that they could
not be enjoyed by any person living at his death or born within 21
years and two possible periods of gestation thereafter.' 2L This was
an absurdity, and yet in most of the states it is still the law. To end
this the statute may well cut off the 21 years and the periods of ges-
tation, except in the case of a posthumous child who might take
under the will, and also the lives of all except beneficiaries under the
limitations in question. There is no occasion for limiting these lives
to two. This would recognize within proper limits the reason for
the law, and would at the same time cut off its artificialities and pre-
vent taking property out of commerce for a longer period than seems
re Homer's Estate, x98 N. Y. S. 665. Michigan follows this rule. Woolfitt v.
Preston, 2o3 Mich. 5o2; Allen v. Merrill, Lynch & Co., 223 Mich. 467. See
also Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267 (two lives and an annuity).
t5G Love v. Windham, I Sid. 45o, nota per Twisden, J.
r7Griffen v. Ford, i Bosw. (N. Y. Supr.) 123; Schermerhom v. Cotting,
131 N. Y. 48; Bird v. Pickford, 141 N. Y. S.
68 Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 42i; Bailey v. Bailey, 97 N. Y. 460;
Buchanan v. Little, 154 N. Y. x47.
Go Thellusson's Case, ii Ves. 112.
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permissible under any public policy ever suggested by court or stat-
ute. To use the language of the New York revisers this would
"abolish all technical rules and distinctions having no relation to the
means of its beneficial enjoyment," and would "define with precision
the limits within which the power of alienation may be suspended."0 0
It is because the Michigan court overlooked the reason for the statute,
and the evils it was intended to avert, that it gave a narrow con-
struction to "power of alienation," and defeated the worthy efforts
of the testator in the Herbst case0' to provide by life interests for
more than two of those who were properly objects of his bounty.
It is the duty of the court, if possible, to give effect to the intent of
the testator.0 2 This could easily have been done in that case by a fair
interpretation of the statute in accord with its reason and spirit. The
court could not, of -course, override the statutory limitation to two
lives, but it could have held there was no suspension of the-absolute
power of alienation. The two lives limitation can be changed only
by the legislature.
The statute in its present form continually thwarts the intent of
testators, and this .without promoting any public policy or serving
any good purpose. Our legislatures doubtless make altogether too
many laws, but here is a need for one good law in the form of a
slight amendment, in language already so many times construed by
the courts that it should not, as many statutes do, merely start a new
train of expensive law suits to determine what the new law means.
It might read:
The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period
than during the lives in being at the creation of the estate of
persons taking under the provisions subject to such limitation
or condition.
The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be
suspended for a longer period than the absolute power of
alienation of real estate.
co Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61, 2o4.
a' Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 22o Mich. 321.
02 In re Tower's Estate, 49 Minn. 371; Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355.
